992 


992 


A  STUD 


OOP  FRONTAGE 


Monograph  No.  4 


Prepared  in  the 

Historical  Branch,  War  Plans  Division 
General  Staff 


December,  1919 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1920 


L/t> 


WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Document  No.  992. 

Office  of  The  Adjutant  General, 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
WASHINGTON,  December  19,  1919. 

The  following  publication,  entitled  "A  Study  in  Troop  Frontage,"  prepared  in  the 
Historical  Branch,  War  Plans  Division,  General  Staff,  is  approved  and  published  for 
the  information  and  guidance  of  all  concerned. 

[062.1,  A.  G.  O.] 
BY   ORDER   OF  THE    SECRETARY   OF   WAR: 

PEYTON  C.  MARCH, 

General,  Chief  of  Staf. 
OFFICIAL: 

P.  C.  HARRIS, 

The  Adjutant  General. 


451439 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 


1.  Introduction. 

The  war  with  Germany  showed  the  same  essential  char- 
acteristics  as  previous  wars.     There  is  a  possibility  that  J^15-  D-  952» 
the  degeneration  of  the  war  on  the  western  front  into. 
trench  warfare  was  not  inevitable,  and  that  the  whole 
war  might  have  been  fought   out   as   an   open-warfare  p-^   War    of 
problem.     However,  by  the  late  fall  of  1914  the  western  Positions.  AMU. 
front  had  stabilized  and   trench  warfare  was  develop- 
ing. (1)  From  this  time,  the  outstanding  feature  of  the 
war,  which  continued  to  be  a  governing  feature  during  its 
continuance,  was  the  existence  of  a  continuous  western 
battle  front,  necessitating  frontal  attacks.     This  factor  re- 
stricted the  art  of  maneuver  to  the  massing  of  troops  on 
various  parts  of  the  "front.  (2)  For  this  reason  a  study  of 
the  strength  in  which  various  parts  of  the  front  wTere  held  6)  7>  ( 
or  attacked  is  not  only  interesting  from  a  historical  view- 
point, but  valuable  in  deducing  sound  practices  for  future 
use. 

Even  an  estimation  of  the  number  of  troops  to  th 
yard  in  battle  is  attended  with  considerable  difficulty  and  Troo     t  to  p  the 
a  good  deal  of  uncertainty.  (3)  The  documents  a  vailable  cgai  Battles  sin™ 
are  so  incomplete  and  liable  to  error  that  to  base  any  jg'MJ  74.^0  enera^ 
general  conclusions  on  facts  drawn  from  the  documents  Library-  (3> 
in  individual  instances  would  be  dangerous,  and  might 
be  misleading.     There  are,  at  present,  available  docu- 
ments sufficiently  well  authenticated  to  guarantee  obtain- 
ing approximately  correct  figures  for  the  practice  of  the 
employment  of  American  troops  in  France.     However,  it 
must  be  realized  that  even  the  most  reliable  documents 
do  not  invariably  present  the  facts  as  they  existed.     Men 
get  lost  or  skulk,  and  are  not  actually  present  on  the  bat- 
tle line  as  active  riflemen,  although  they  may  be  carried 
as  present  for  duty  on  division  returns.     As  for  publica- 
tions  pertaining   to    armies    other   than    the   American 
Army,  they  must  be  viewed  with  considerable  distrust. 
It  was  perfectly  natural  that  during  the  war  both  French 
and  British  military  authorities  should  keep  secret  the 
real  strength  and  disposition  of  forces.     As  instancing  the 

5 


6  A   STUDY   IN   TEOOP   FRONTAGE. 


odf  difficulty  of  obtaining  facts,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  only 
§!ava^a^e  %ures  on  the  organization  of  British  divisions 
place  the  infantry  rifle  strength  at  approximately  12,000 
'es  in  Or-  rifles  in  twelve  battalions.  (4)  The  only  document  indi- 
y  dScating  tnat  tne  actual  organization  had  fallen  below  this 
rorpSnSS  °w2£  strength  is  a  cablegram  from  Gen.  Pershing  in  January, 
which    indicates    a    contemplated    reduction    of 
divisions  from  twelve  to  nine  battalions.  (5)  How- 
biegram  ^487,  A  .  e  ver  ^  '^  jg  ft  f  ac^  attested  to  by  American  officers  serving 
i9i8.  H.  B.  files.  with  the  British,  that  this  reduction  was  actually  made  by 
the  early  spring  of  1918,  before  the  German  offensive  of 
March  21,  1918,  and  that  even  the  nine  remaining  bat- 
talions were  seldom  maintained  at  fuh1  strength.     During 
the  campaign  of  1918,  when  the  27th  and  30th  Divisions 
of  the  Second  Corps  were  considerably  under  strength,  it 
was  estimated  that  each  one  of  these  divisions  had  an 
effective  rifle  strength  twice  that  of  the  normal  British 
o  division  with  which  they  were  operating.  (6)   It  is,  never- 
,  believed  that,  from  a  general  study  of  conditions 
NOV.  s,  1919.    (6)  existing  and  the  disposition  of  forces  taken  to  meet  these 
conditions,  approximate  figures  can  be  obtained  and  val- 
uable lessons  learned. 

2.  Bases  for  Computation. 

In  a  study  involving  comparisons  in  such  a  large  field 
as  the  war  with  Germany  offers,  a  basis  of  comparison 
must  be  immediately  established  and  consistently  ad- 
hered to,  in  order  to  avoid  confusion  in  the  mind  of  the 
student  and  consequent  lack  of  clearness.  For  the  pur- 
pose of  this  study  one  hundred  yards  is  taken  as  the  front- 
age unit,  and  the  strength  is  expressed  in  the  number  of 
Infantry  rifles. 

The  choice  of  hundreds  of  yards  instead  of  kilometers 

is  unimportant.     The  yard  is  our  national  and  tradi- 

tionally our  military  unit.     It  was  used  throughout  the 

British    situa-war  by  the  British.  (7)     While  the  A.  E.  F.  in  France 

tion  maps    D-l.  %  ,  .  .  . 

Map  ^rqorn^  flies,  used  the  French  unit  as  convenient,  the  units  are  easily 
c  Report  kc.^in  convertible.  (8)  (100  yards  equal  91.44  meters,  roughly, 
wed  '  NOV.''  20  1/1  1  of  a  kilometer.)  The  number  one  hundred  in  yards 

yio,  pp.   ID  ana  t  .  /»     i       •         i       •  -i  /• 

19.  (8)  is  taken  to  obviate  the  use  of  decimals  in  number  of 

rifles  per  unit  of  front.  In  this  connection  it  should  be 
noted  that  the  width  of  front  given  in  the  following  para- 
graphs is  measured  from  the  actual  front  line  as  it  appears 
on  operation  maps.  Following  in  general  the  eccentric- 
ities of  that  line,  it  may  vary  therefore  very  greatly  from 


A  STUDY  11$  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  7 

the  width  of  the  zone  in  which  the  unit  concerned  is  em- 
ployed, the  width  of  the  zone  being  normally  measured 
at  right  angles  to  the  direction  of  expected  attack  or 
resistance. 

The  choice  of  the  Infantry  rifle  as  the  unit  of  strength 
is  not  so  easily  justified.     The  proportion  of  tanks,  air- 
planes, special  weapons,  and  above  all,  artillery,  entered 
largely  into  the  strength  in  which  fronts  were  held  or 
attacked.  (9)     However,  principal   authorities   agree  on  wFeat  uresgof  *&» 
the  supreme  importance  of  the  rifle  and  the  fact  that  rifle  17-25.  (9)^  ' 
strength  is  a  true  index  of  effective  man  power.     Ac-  c  E^t-E°frc-  c£ 
cepting  rifle  strength  as  an  index,  it  must  be  consistently  J&r  NOV.''  20, 
arrived  at.  (10)     Here  it  is  taken  as  Infantry  rifles 
divisions  which  are  in  the  front  line  as  units  and  dispose  P-  104-  <io) 
wholly  of  their  Infantry.     The  division  is  the  unit  uni- 
versally used   in    computing    strength.  (11)     It    is    the    Kept,  of  c.  in 
responsible  unit  in  both  attack  and  defense,  (12)   com-  tied  'NOV.''  20, 
bining  as  it  does,  all  ma]  or  arms  except  the  Air  Service,    Th^'war  with 

,,       ,...  .-,  ...     Germany.  Ayers, 

and  if  employed  as  a  complete  division  must  have  at  its  p.  101.  (ii) 

•    •  11    -r     <•  »/i  mi        T    f  -n  i         Instructions  on 

disposition  all  Infantry  rifles.  The  Infantry  rifles  only  the  offensive  Ac- 
are  included  in  computing  frontage  strength.  The  regi-  units  m  Battle, 

.,    ,  .     .    .  -.  •  j»i  *       j_*  No.    767,    Head- 

ments  of  divisional  engineers  are  powerlul  organizations,  Quarters,  A.  E. 
armed  with  the  rifle.  They  were  frequently  used  as  In-  'instructions  on 

,  .  ,    ,     ,  .      .-.      the  Defensive  Ac- 

fan  trV-  (13)     However,  such  use  is  not  contemplated  in  the  tion    of    Large 

'    J.  „  ,.    .    .  .     .  -ii  Units  in  Battle. 

organization  of  divisions,  nor  was  it  invariable  or  even  cus-  w.  D.  D.  794, 
tomary.  (14)  The  British  division  had  a  similar  powerful  T.'of  o.,  series 
engineer  organization.  (15)  The  French,  however,  allowed  *F.  o.  49,  1st 

,  &    ,.     .    .     &         ,         ,  .  .  .    Div.,  Oct.  8,  1918. 

the  division  only  the  engineers  necessary  lor  purely  engi-  H.  B.  201-13.  cm 
neering  work.  (16)  To  include  the  engineers  in  .figuring  par.p3,eik  o.  47, 
frontage  strength  would  complicate,  without  increasing  ibis.  H.  '£.201-13! 
the  value  of,  the  figures  arrived  at.  The  American  Infantry  changes  m  or- 

.       '  ;,  •       i      i     i   •       ,1        «•  T    /•  •  ,     ganization  Found 

rifle  strength  as  included  in  the  lour  Inlantry  regiments  Necessary  during 
of  the  division  is  13,  568.  (17)  This  includes  the  auto-  pean  war.  w.c. 

..,  ,      '  ,       '  ,      ,  ,,  ,  .  D.  4886-23.   Gen- 

matic  rifle  strength,  but  excludes  the  machine-gun  erai  staff  college 
strength.  An  effort  was  made  throughout  to  keep  di-  Tableaux  d'Ef- 

P  .     -      r  fectifs,    1913-1918. 

visions  up  to  strength  by  replacements,  (18)  and  they  can  General  staucoi- 

i  i  i     •  2.  1   i        f    n  ^i     lege  Library.  (16) 

be  accepted   as  being  at  approximately  full  strength,    T.  of  o  series 
except  where  otherwise  noted.     At  the  beginning  of  the  and  3.  (i?) 
war  the  British  Infantry  division,  with  a  total  of  somec..eA.'    E.  "F. 

.  ,          ,  _.  T  cabled    Nov.  20, 

18,000,   was  considered   to  dispose  of   11,676   Infantry  wis,  P.  23.  (is) 
rifles.  (19)     It  is  impossible  from  the  facts  at  hand  to    Ftrcn<rth    ^^ 
determine  exactly  how  this  strength  varied  during  the  {Jfl^fS    of 
war,  but  in  Januar}^  1918,  it  had  apparently  dropped  to  cran]5!' 
something  like  9,000.  (20)     Following  heavy  losses  in  the  {J 


NO." 


8  A   STUDY  IN   TROOP   FRONTAGE. 


offensives  of  March  21  and  April  11,  1918,  this 
™'  strength  was  undoubtedly  further  reduced  and  by  the 
s^summer  °f  1918  can  be  taken  as  approximately  6,000.  (21) 
.Ss,'A  normal  French  division  in  1914  included  4  Infantry 
1919.  (2i  'regiments  of  12  battalions,  with  1,000  Infantry  rifles  to 

HMory°UoFThItne  battalion.  (22)     This  organization  was  also  modified 
3u22)     '  l>  P'  during  ^ne  warj  and  at  the  time  of  the  American  entry  in 
force  in  1918  the  normal  French  Infantry  division  in- 
cluded 1  Infantry  brigade  of  3  regiments  and  had  an 
Infantry  rifle  strength  of  6,880,  exclusive  of  the  machine- 
Tableaux  d'Ef-  gun  companies..  (23)  '   The  reduction  in  rifle  strength  in 
General  staff  Coi-  the  division  would  naturally  be  gradual.     It  was  recog- 
'3  nized  and  accepted  as  inevitable,  however,  by  the  change 
in   organization   made   in    1916,   after  great  losses  had 
been  suffered  at  Verdun,  but  before  the  battle  on  the 
statement     OfSomme.(24)     The  strength  of  Infantry   in   French   In- 
chua"mb0r'un!fantry  divisions  is  given  by  Gen.  Pershing  in  May,  1918, 
N£?!C  14,    1919!  as  being  one-half    that  of  the  Infantry  strength  in  an 
Confidential  ca-  American  division.  (25)     This  would  make  the  Infantry 
AeE.F°"Mayii|rifle  strength  of  a  French  division  from  that  date  ap- 
proximately 6,750. 

With  the  factors  of  strength  and  unit  of  front  estab- 
lished, there  remains  necessary  a  classification  of  various 
types  of  front  in  order  to  study  the  strength  in  which 
they  were  held  or  attacked.  In  a  war  which  passed 
from  open  warfare  through  the  most  stilted  form  of 
trench  fighting  and  approached  absolutely  open  warfare 
again  in  the  days  preceding  the  armistice,  types  run 
into  one,  another.  The  division  into  four  types  is  there- 
fore arbitrary.  These  types  are:  (a)  The  quiet  front; 
(6)  the  active  front;  (c)  the  front  of  a  major  operation 
on  a  stabilized  line  ;  (d)  the  front  in  open  warfare.  This 
classification  is  more  natural  in  the  character  of  tne 
war  after  the  American  entry  than  in  the  trench  warfare 
which  preceded  it.  However,  the  last  year  of  the  war  is  the 
Hept.ofc.inc..most  fruitful  part  for  the  purposes  of  this  study.  From 
tne  German  offensive  of  March  21,  1918,  the  part  played 
by  the  man  with  the  rifle  on  the  western  front  became 
increasingly  important.  (26)  In  spite  of  the  immense 
number  of  participants  and  casualties  at  Verdun  and  on 
History  of  the  the  Somme,  these  operations  were  in  principle  a  conflict 
monds.  \aoi.  iii,'  of  material  resources,  artillery,  ammunition  and  trench 
mechanisms  and  were  not  essentially  based  on  the  rifle 
strength  per  yard.  (2  7) 


A  STUDY  IN   TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

(a)  A  quiet  front  is  taken  as  one  on  which  the  char- 
acter of  the  ground  or  the  disposition,  of  forces  renders 
it  unlikely  that  a  major  operation  will  develop.  (I)  An 
active  front  is  taken  as  one  on  which  actiATe  major  opera- 
tions have  recently  occurred,  or  on  which  they  can  be 
expected  soon  to  occur,  (c)  The  front  of  a  major 
operation  on  a  stabilized  line  is  one  on  which  a  major 
operation  on  such  a  line  is  actually  in  progress  and  is 
restricted  to  the  center  of  attack  or  defense  in  which 
participation  is  complete,  (d)  The  front  in  open  warfare 
is  one  on  which  action  is  concerned  with  an  enemy  in  the 
open  and  not  with  a  continuous  line  held  by  or  against 
the  enemy. 

3.  General  Discussion  of  Formations. 

Before  citing  instances  from  which  to  draw  frontage 
strength,  it  is  interesting  to  note  in  general  formations 
adopted  in  attack  and  in  defense  and  in  particular  those 
adopted  by  American  divisions.  It  must  not,  however, 
be  forgotten  that  whatever  the  formation,  a  division 
must  be  considered  to  engage  on  its  front  its  entire  rifle 
strength  present  within  the  division. 

The  French  formation  for   attack  in   1914   may   bo    London 
accepted  as  not  abnormal.     Briefly,  it  employed  depth  war.  "vol.  i,  p. 
with  only  the  necessary  troops  deployed.  (28)     On  the 
defensive  an  attempt  to  preserve  depth  was  evident  in 
the  organization  of  positions  into  trench  systems  in  the 
earlier  years  of  trench  warfare.     An  even  distribution 
in  depth,  however,  was  sacrificed  to  the  desirability  of 
utilizing  the  shelter  afford ed  by  trenches  for  the  protec- 
tion of  all  troops.     This  tended  toward  a  dense  occupation    The  war  of  PO- 
of  trenches  which  was  emphasized  at  points  of  tactical  ss'S^eq.lS?'  * 
importance.  (29)     These  methods  proved   too  costly  at    History  of  the 
Verdun  and  on  the  Somme,(30)  and  were  abandoned  inmonds.  VOL  ILL 
favor  of  very  deep  formations  to  conserve  man  po 
and  to  give  elasticity  to  the  defense.     In  attack,  depth    instruction  OB 

£  A.'  i      i  •,        i   /„-  \      -XT-  -,  the  Offensive  Use 

lormations  were  habitual.  (3 1 )    JN  o  authenticated  instance  of  Large  units  m 
is  known  of  deliberate  use  of  mass  formations.     Periodic  Hq.  A.  E!  .F^ 
reports  in  the  press  of  all  nations  of  enemy  attacks  in  ^instructions  on 
mass  probably  record  honest  delusions.     The  impression  of  Largenunits  S 
of  power  received  on  the  front  of  a  battalion  advancing  794,  lois.  (3i)' 
in  an  attack  maneuver  is  tremendous,  even  though  the 
battalion  be  organized  more  than  600  yards  in  depth. 
The  human  mind  in  such  cases  tends  to  associate  mass 
with  power. 

155880°— 20 2 


10  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

A  depth  formation  was  habitually  used  by  American 

divisions.     The  exact  formation,  however,  depended  on 

the  physical  and  military  aspect  of  the  front  and  the 

DI>   °Jufy'  ^established  practice  in  the  division  in  question.     One 

i318'(s^'  B*  201~  experienced    division    held    or    attacked    with    brigades 

DIV    °sept7'  IQ  abreast,   regiments   abreast,   battalions  in   depth,    as   a 

WF"  o    35,  2dnormal  formation.  (32)     Another  varied   its  formations 

H.VB'.m  (33)918*  and  sometimes  attacked  with  brigades  in  depth.  (33)     At 

times  on  very  quiet  fronts  divisions  were  compelled  to 

hold  with  reduced  depth. 

4.  American  Occupation  of  a  Quiet  Front. 

faSShead  G  i?cf  On  August  19,  1918,  the  5th  Division  held  a  front  of 
i9r5ti9?8iv'Jli1ag'a^out  325  hundred  yards  in  the  St.  Die  Sector.  (34) 
™>m  rfll(es4)  <A  Its  Infantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  about  12,000. 


turns  ^ul  '  and  ®*^     ^ne  ^rontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  was  there- 
£ug.,'  wi8^  riles  fore  about  37  Infantry  rifles.     The  St.  Die  Sector  was  in 
the    heart    of    the    Vosges  Mountains,   whose   physical 
characteristics   were   unfavorable   to   major   operations. 

Features  of  the  \  ,    ,T  •  -i  •  ,  • 

War.  Haig,  p.  16.  At  this  period  major  operations  were  in  progress  or  con- 


d*  templated  from  the  Moselle  to  the  sea,  and  quiet  fronts 
P.T3.C36)'    :918'  would  naturally  be  lightly  held.  (36) 

On  July  26,  1918,  the  77th  Division  held  a  front  of 
about  185  hundred  yards  in  the  Baccarat  Sector.  (37)  Its 
jJJgSaJEg  Infantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was   about  12,800. 
j&y7726,   ?9i8.'(38)     The   frontage   strength  per  hundred  yards  would 
Mam^mestherefore  be  about  69  lnfantry  rifles.      The   Baccarat 
oTV'jSy,  Sector,  while  in  the  western  Vosges,  might  be  involved 
riija    °*in  any  major  operation  on  the  favorable  ground  around 
Nancy.     At  this  date,  however,  major  operations  were  in 
progress  much  farther  west. 

official     map     On  August  23,  1918,  the  89th  Division  held  a  front  of 

MV.,  GAul  23,  about  175  hundred  yards  in  the  Lucey  Sector.  (39)     Its 

MJsV3,aA\E°°F!  Infantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  about  12,000,  (40) 

89th  Div.  Re-  The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  therefore 

iQia3   rfies  ugofbe  about  68  Infantry  rifles.     The  Lucey  Sector  was  in 

the  Woevre,  where  the  front  had  been  inactive  for  years, 

^and  the  thickening  of  the  line  for  the  St.  Mihiel  operations 

c.,  A.  E.  F.,'ca-was  delaved  beyond  this  date  to  secure  the  effect  of  sur- 

lled     Nov.     20,  f  •* 

1918,  p.  13.  (41)      prise.  (41) 

^Ma^fumghed  Qn  August  24,  1918,  the  29th  Division  held  a  front  of 
Aug.  ^24^  i|J8!  about  155  hundred  yards  east  of  Belfort.(42)  Its  In- 
G^A.E.^.^fa^jy  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  about  12,800.  (43) 
turns  ^^^The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  there- 
A.  G.  o.  (43)  xfore  be  about  83  Infantry  rules.  While  major  operations 
would  be  possible  through  the  Belfort  gap,  the  need  for 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  11 

troops  in  the  battle  raging  in  the  north  assured  that  this 
would  remain  a  quiet  sector. 

The  average  frontage  strength  in  the  four  instances 
given  is,  for  every  hundred  yards,   64  Infantry  rifles. 
This    can    be    taken    as    approximating    the    normal. 
Figures   drawn  from   other  instances  might  materially 
modify    the    average    given,    but    the    instances   cited 
are   believed  to  be  normal,  while   many  other  occupa- 
tions which  might  have  been  cited  might  be  abnormal 
and  based  on  convenience.     For  example,  on  August  16, 
1918,  the  1st  Division  held  a  front  of  about  115  hundred  b  Map  Burnished 
yards,   in   the   Saizerais  Sector.  (44)     Its  Infantry  rifle  J^m191|{es''  jfap 
strength  on  this  date  was  about  13,000.  (45)     The  front-  A.T.  rjf*) 
age  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  therefore  be  USturnsforJuiyaM 

ter  ...,,,  .  August.      1918. 

Infantry  rifles.     The  division  held  nearly  twice  as  power-  rnes  of  A.  G.  o. 

fully  as  the  89th  Division  on  its  immediate  left.    No  reason 

is  apparent  for  this  condition  other  than  convenience. 

The  division  held  this  sector  for  only  a  few  weeks  between 

two  major  operations  and  it  was  convenient  to  have  it 

take  over  the  exact  sector  of  the  weaker  French  division 

it  relieved. 

5.  American  Occupation  of  an  Active  Front. 

On  June  4,  1918,  the  1st  Division  held  a  front  of  about    Map  furnished 
76  hundred  yards  in  the  Cantigny  Sector.  (46)     Its  In-  4,yi9i8.  Map  room 
fantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  about  13, 000.  (47)  (46) 
The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  the  re- turns  for  May  and 

„          ,          ,  -   T     /•  -n  »  ,    ,1  •       T     ,  s^  June,  1918.    Files 

fore  be  about  171  Infantry  rifles.     At  this  date  a  German  A.  G.  o.  Fiie48> 
major  offensive  was  imminently  expected  on  this  front, 
and  the  Artillery  preparation  for  the  German  offensive 
from  Montdidier  to  Noyon  on  June  9,   1918,  actually 
included  this  front. 

On  August  16,   1918,  the  3d  Corps  held  a  front  of    official  map  of 
about  120  hundred  yards  at  Fismes  on  the  Vesle.     It  Aug.  CIG,    ?9is. 
had   in  line  the  28th  and  77th  Divisions(48)  with  ano-3,A.E.F. 
Infantry  rifle    strength    of    approximately   2 1,000.  (4 9)  Army  Corps, Aug. 
The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  there-  iss-2.  (48) 
fore  be  about  175  Infantry  rifles.     The  advance  to  the  Div.  Returns  for 
Vesle  had  just  been  completed  and  this  front  was  held  isis.  aFiies  ugof 

J    .,,  .  ,  ,.       .  '      A.  G.  0.(49) 

against  possible  strong  reaction  and  preliminary  to  an    Rept.  of  c.  in 
offensive  from  the  Vesle.  (50)  bfed  '  NOV.  ''  20, 

On  September  21,  1918,  the  78th  Division  held  a  front19 
of  about  76  hundred  yards  northeast  of  Thiaucourt.  (51)    The     Tactical 
Its  Infantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  about  12,300.  ?8thp^A.E.tF.! 
(52)     The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  M *  c.;  sejS 
be  about  162  Infantry  rifles.     The  division  had  relieved  $?J9!Sn  H'  B- 


12  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

2d  and   5th   Divisions    after  the  St.  Mihiel  opera- 
and  was  holding   the  front  against  possible  strong 
*52)  reaction. 

The  average  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  in 
the  instances  given,  covering  four  divisions,  was  171  Infan- 
try rifles.  This  can  be  accepted  as  approximating  the 
normal.  There  were  not  many  cases  of  the  occupation 
of  an  active  front  by  American  divisions  except  when 
engaged  in  major  operations. 

6.  American  Participation  in  a  Major  Operation. 

On  July  18,  1918,  the  1st  Division  attacked  on  a  front 
Div'.,  °ju?y*  il!°f  about  29  hundred  yards  south  of  Soissons.(53)  Its 
(53)"  H-B-201~13-  Infantry  rifle  strength  on  this  date  was  approximately 
turns  ?o7' June  13, 500.  (54)  The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards 
nils  S A!  G.9o: would  be  about  465  Infantry  rifles. 

On  September  12,  1918,  the  5th  Division  attacked  on 
F.  o.  41,  sth  a  front  of  about  25  hundred  yards  in  the  St.  Mihiel  oper- 
KIS^H.'  B.P2ofcatioii.(55)     Its    Infantry   rifle    strength    on    this    date 
5' Weekly  Graph-  was  approximately  12, 900.  (56)     The  frontage  strength 
Bcpt?f  ?5T°i9i8!  Per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  516  Infantry  rifles. 
F  skSeiSxmA*E5tii  It  should  be  noted  here  that  this  is  the  greatest  strength 
G-3'flies,"A^°.rF'.  that  will  appear  in  this  study.     The  following  condi- 
tions  appear    to  have    produced  it:    The    division   was 
attacking   through   comparatively   open  ground   in   the 
center  of   the   main  attack   of   the   First  Army.     This 
explains  why  its  strength  per  unit  of  front  is  the  maxi- 
mum in  the  Army,  approximately  equaled  by  the  2d 
and  42d  Divisions,  which  attacked  under  similar  circum- 
stances, but  greater  than  that  of  the  89th,  also  a  center 
^Official  map^of division,  but  facing  a  solid  mass  of  woods,  where  prog- 
mIs"G-3a\  E°°Flress  snould  be  slower  and  the  need  of  original  impulse 
f eSrm?f C'& conse<luently  less. (57)     Success    in    this    operation  was 
es,A.E.F.(57)cf  prime  importance,   and  the  First  Army  had  ample 
reserve  divisions  which  could  have  been  used  to  thicken 
cfX*E?*F^<£tne  kne   if  necessary.  (58)     It,    therefore,   appears   that 
Sis,  p^?v"i4-i5!  the  strength  per  unit  of  front  shown  by  the  5th  Division 
was    the    greatest    economically    desirable    in    a    major 
operation.     The  instance  can,  however,  be  fairly  cited 
in  arriving  at  the  frontage  strength  in  a  major  operation, 
as  only  center  divisions  are  wholly  committed  to  the 
hid ^ott/nsivl'  operation  as  such.     Against  this  figure  should  be  noted, 
G-3%™EmF.mes  however,  the  frontage  strength  on  the  whole  front  of  the 
o.f2?'E? F?i  cS southern   St.   Mihiel   attack.     The    1st   and   4th  Corps, 
ms,  PP!°5-i4?°'  with  seven  divisions  in  line,  had  about  89,000  Infantry 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  13 


rifles  on  a  front  of  about  380  hundred  yards.  (59)  The  i 
frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  235  t 
Infantry  rifles  over  the  whole  front  of  these  two  corps. 

On  September  26,  1918,  the  5th  Corps  attacked  in  the  ^ 
center  of  the  First  Army  attack  on  a  front  of  about  1  1  5 
hundred  yards  between  the  Meuse  River  and  the  Argonne  Aj^pf'c  in  c 
Forest.     It  had  the  79th,  37th,  and  91st  Divisions  in  line  £o^»  'loS^p! 
(60)  with  an  Infantry  rifle  strength  of  about  37,000.  (61)  ^'Skiy  Graph- 
The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  about 
32  1  Infantry  rifles.  <*-*•  A- 

On   October   17,    1918,   the  2d  Corps  attacked  as  a 
part  of  the  Fourth  British  Army  on  a  front  of  about  40 
.hundred  yards  south  of  Le  Cateau.     It  had  the  27th  and 
30th  Divisions  in  line  (62),  with  an  Infantry  rifle  strength 
of  about  16,300.  (63)     The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  gg^  G2^  A  g 
yards  would  be  about  408  Infantry  rifles.     The  average  (63) 
frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  in  the  instances 
given,  covering  seven  divisions,  was  about  394  Infantry 
rifles.     This  can  be  accepted  as  approximately  normal, 
and  conforms  to  British  and  French  statements  as 
best  practices.  (64) 

1918.  (64) 

7.  American  Participation  in  Open  Warfare.  F    O    57    *d 

On  November  11,  1918,  the  3d  Corps  was  attacking  in^SS^S 
the  First  Army  on  a  front  of  about  295  hundred  yards  18Ma'P  Of  Meuse- 
east  of  the  Meuse.  It  had  in  line  the  32d,  5th,  and  90th  £v^V  °rSm~ 
Divisions,  (65)  with  an  Infantry  rifle  strength  of  about  $5)  G-3'A'E'F- 
25,000.  (66)  The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  icsW<^oi£S5; 
was  about  85  Infantry  rifles.  rnls  G-IO;A.E.F: 

On  the  same  date  and  under  the  same  command,  the  (6Map  of  Meuse- 
5th  Corps  was  attacking  on  a  front  of  about  200  hundred  £vl?^ap°room~ 
yards  in  an  operation  involving  crossing  the  Meuse.  It  m§ept?'c.  in'a' 
had  in  line  the  89th  and  2d  Divisions,  (67)  with  a  riffo&r^SS* 
strength  of  about  18,000.  (68)  The  frontage  strength  fVSiy  Graph- 
per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  90  Infantry  rifles.  Npv?f  ^ 
The  average  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  in^f  G~1 
the  instances  given,  covering  five  divisions,  was  87  Infantry 
rifles.  This  may  be  taken  as  not  abnormal,  even  if  not 
deduced  from  long  experience.  Warfare  in  the  battle 
between  the  Meuse  and  the  Argonne  gradually  changed 
character  from  assault  on  an  elaborately  organized 
position  on  September  26  to  practically  open  war  on 
November  11.  It  is  from  the  last  date,  therefore,  that 
instances  are  taken. 


14  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  attack  was  not  neces- 
sarily continuous  along  the  front  of  a  division,  and  that 
the  map  even  shows  definitely  that  the  line  was  not  con- 
tinuous.    An   advance   by   column   on   a  narrow  front 
instanced  by  the  2d  Division  on  November  3d  might 
pull  forward  the  entire  Army  front.     These  figures  show 
an  interesting    and   abrupt   change   from   the  frontage 
•  strength  of  major  operations,  from  which  open  warfare 
may  swiftly  materialize.     Corroborated  by  French  and 
British  experience,  they  indicate  that  the  dense  massing 
of  troops,  made  possible  by  stabilization  of  a  front,  is 
Features  of  the  forbidden  in  open  warfare  by  difficulties  attendant  on 
<69)r'  Haig' p>  12' troop  movement,  supply,  and  communication.  (69) 

8.  General  Discussion  of  French  and  British  Practices. 

It  would  be  misleading  to  attempt  to  compute  French 
and   British   practices   from   specific   instances.     Docu- 
ments giving  such  instances  are  generally  only  available 
owing  to  association  of  our  units  with  foreign  units,  and 
are  too  infrequently  available  to  warrant  drawing  gen- 
eral  conclusions    and    data   therefrom.     General  state- 
ments as  to  practices  are  found  in  studies  on  the  number 
of  troops  to  the  yard  in  principal  battles  during  the  last 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  deductions  drawn 
Memorandum  therefrom  by  foreign  authorities.  (70)     These  practices 
Troops^o1  the  are  more  or  less  confirmed,  and  at  any  rate  brought  up  to 
cipai  Battles  siilce  date,  in  instructions  issued  by  French  and  British  mili- 
staff ' College6  Li-  tary  authorities  toward  the  end  of  the  war  with  Germany, 
which  give  the  desirable  practices  in  certain  instances.  (71) 
the  Defensive  A°C- The  specific  instances  given  below  are  only  of  value  as 

tion     of     Large    ,          .  ...  ,  .  j    /•        i 

units  in  Battle,  showing  a  tendency  to  maintain  the  attacking  or  defend- 

W     D     D     794 

1918.   '  'ing  strength  prescribed  in  the  instruction  pamphlets,  as 

The  Division  in  ,  •        -,    i  •  c    ,1        T, 

Attack,  ss- 135,  determined  by  the  general  experiences   of  the  French 

Nov..  1918.    Gen-         ,    ^    . , .   ,        J      .  „  TT 

erai  staff  College  and  British  armies  on  the  western  front.     Very  general 
rary'  and  valuable  information  is  afforded  by  copies  of  French 

Allied  Order  of  Battle  Maps,  but  information  as  to  actual 
British  occupations  is  less  satisfactory. 

9.  French  and  British  Occupation  of  a  Quiet  Front. 

On  June  25,  1916,  the  French  Group  of  Armies  of  the 
East  held  a  front  of  about  2,900  hundred  yards  from  St. 
oS??ai0oSe?c?fMihiel  to  the  Swiss  border,  with  18  divisions  in  line.  (72) 
25*api9i£No  exact  data  as  to  the  strength  of  these  divisions  are 
72)  available.     Divisional     strengths     varied     considerably. 
This  was  about  the  time  of  the  change  in  organization  of 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  15 


French  divisions.  (73)   The  strength  is  therefore  taken 

6,880  Infantry  rifles  per  division,  the  full  strength  in  the  £  *n*  J1  b  1 

new  organization.     The  strength  of  the  18  divisions  would  Nov-  14>  1918-  <73> 

be  about  143,840  Infantry  rifles.     The  frontage  strength 

per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  49  Infantry  rifles. 

On  October  13,  1918,  the  same  Group  of  Armies  held 
a  front  of  about  2,  100  hundred  yards  from  Nomeny  to  the 
Swiss  border,  with   12  French  and  3  American,  or  the 
equivalent    of    18    French    divisions,    in   line.  (74)     At  oS 
divisional  strengths  given  in  Gen.  Pershing's  cablegram  ilftli9i8?p'  Sap 
of  May  1  1,  1918,  the  rifle  strength  would  be  about  121,500.  Tf.  F?(?4)  G"3' 
The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  58 
Infantry  rifles. 

The   average  for   the   two   cases   cited  would   be   54 
Infantry  rifles  per  hundred  yards.     This  does  not  vary 
too  much  from  cases  of  exceptional  extension  in  preced- 
ing wars,  which  have  fallen  as  low  as  80  Infantry  rifles 
per  hundred  yards  for  defending  troops.  (75)     Nor  does 
the  French  figure  materially  differ  from  that  of  American  ySSfSi  the 
divisions  on  similar  fronts,  which  has  been  seen  to  be  Se  i85o.atGen- 
about  64  Infantry  rifles  per  hundred  yards. 

On  November  11,  1917,  the  British  Third  Army  held  a 
front  of  about  600  hundred  yards  in  front  of  Cambrai,  with 
1  1  divisions  in  line.  (76)  No  exact  figures  on  the  strength  og°py 
of  these  divisions  are  available.  Before  Gen.  Byng'sgattie  ^ 
tank  attack  the  Cambrai  front  was  regarded  as  being  Map'  rooin^  files 
as  quiet  a  sector  as  any  in  the  British  zone,  and  the<76)' 
map  shows  that  it  was  lightly  held  in  comparison  to 
the  rest  of  the  British  front.  The  holding  divisions  can 
therefore  be  taken  as  depleted  to  a  rifle  strength  of  about 
9,000  each  or  the  average  for  the  early  spring  of  1918. 
The  Army  rifle  strength  would  be  about  99,000.  The 
frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  165 
Infantry  rifles.  It  will  be  noted  that  this  is  a  much  larger 
figure  than  that  found  in  the  case  of  American  and  French 
occupations.  The  discrepancy  is  probably  explained 
by  the  fact  that  on  no  part  of  the  British  front  were,  major 
operations  so  unlikely,  on  account  of  difficulties  of 
terrain,  as  in  the  Vosges  Sector,  from  which  American  and 
French  instances  have  been  taken. 

10.  French  and  British  Occupation  of  an  Active  Front. 

On  August  23,  1916,  the  French  Second  Army  held  a  oSS  0orFdeernCohf 
front  of  about  850  hundred  yards  around  Verdun,  with 
17  divisions  in  line.  (77)     It  has  been  seen  that  French 


16  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

divisions  had  recently  been  reduced  to  three  Infantry 
regiments;  the  full  strength  of  the  new  organization 
is  therefore  taken,  or  6,880  Infantry  rifles.  This  gives  a 
total  for  the  Army  of  about  1 16,960  Infantry  rifles.  The 
frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  137 
Infantry  rifles,  which  can  bo  accepted  as  not  abnormal. 
On  the  date  in  question  the  German  assault  had  been 

History  of  the  worn  out  (78)  and  the  front  may  be  considered  as  merely 
in"  veIT  active.  Despite  the  statement  in  French  instruc- 
tions that  divisional  fronts  depend  on  varying  conditions, 
and  that  there  is  no  average  or  theoretical  front,  French 
military  authorities  give  an  approximate  front  for  a  divi- 
sion engaged  in  actual  defensive  battle  in  1918  as  from 

instructions  on22  to  44  hundred  yards.  (79)  Assuming  that  the  lesser 
ity  may  be  taken,  on  a  front  where  battle  is  merely 
expected,  the  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would 
be  153  Infantry  rifles.  This  agrees  nearly  enough  to  con- 
firm, as  of  value,  the  factor  of  137  found  in  the  case  of  the 
French  Second  Army. 

Map  of  Mar.  IT,  ^n  March  17,1918,  the  British  Third  Army  held  a  front 
'  about  430  hundred  yards  in  the  vicinity  of  Arras,  with 
divisions  in  line.  (80)  It  has  been  seen  that  before 
this  date  British  divisions  were  reduced  to  9  battalions. 
The  strength  of  the  10  divisions  would  therefore  be  90,000 
Infantry  rifles  at  the  maximum.  The  frontage  strength 
per  hundred  yards  would  be  210  Infantry  rifles  at  the 
maximum. 

11.  French  and  British  Participation  in  a  Major  Operation. 

oS^^riGTS  On  August  10,  1918,  the  French  First  Army  was  at- 
5?gtle  wapms  tacking,  in  conjunction  with  the  attack  of  the  British 
'  (lif  Fourth  Army,  on  a  front  of  about  300  hundred  yards 
in  the  vicinity  of  Montdidier.  It  had  10  divisions  in  tho 
front  line,  (81)  which  at  the  strength  which  has  been 
accepted  from  May,  1918,  give  a  rifle  strength  of  about 
67,500.  The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  would 
be  227  Infantry  rifles. 

It  wiji  be  noted  that  despite  the  fact  that  this  attack 
was  one  of  the  most  successful  of  the  war,  the  frontage 
strength  is  very  much  smaller  than  that  determined  for 
individual  American  divisions  in  similar  attacks,  such  as 
that  of  the  5th  Division  at  St.  Mihiel.  However,  the 
density  is  naturally  reduced  in  figuring  from  the  large 
front  and  strength  of  an  army,  by  the  inclusion  of  divi- 
sions on  the  flank  of  the  attack  which  may  not  be  actually 


A   STUDY  TN   TROOP   FRONTAGE.  17 

assaulting  on  the  day  in  question,  and  consequently  are 
in  lesser  density.  It  will  be  remembered  that  while  the 
frontage  strength  of  the  5th  Division  at  St.  Mihiel  was 
516  Infantry  rifles,  the  frontage  strength  computed  for 
the  whole  southern  attack  was  only  235  Infantry  rifles 
per  hundred  yards.  The  French  figure  approaches;  how- 
ever, the  maximum  density  of  306  Infantry  rifles  per 
hundred  yards  for  a  division  engaged  in  defensive  battle, 
obtained  from  the  French  instructions  cited  in  the  pre- 
ceding numbered  paragraph.  The  maximum  density 
under  such  circumstances  may  be  accepted  as  approxi- 
mately the  proper  density  for  a  division  on  favorable 
ground  in  the  center  of  a  major  offensive. 

An  example  'of  what  may  be  considered  the  greatest 
density  desirable  under  the  circumstances  may  be 
obtained  from  the  following  incident:  Gen.  Petain 
gave  Gen.  Fayolle,  commanding  the  Group  of  Armies 
of  the  Reserve,  12  divisions  for  the  attack  of  July  18, 
1918,  south  of  Soissons.  Later  Gen.  Petain  asked  if 
one  of  these  divisions  could  be  spared.  Gen.  Fayolle 
answered  that  it  could,  as  his  original  plan  had  called 
for  one  division  to  attack  in  the  valley  of  the  Aisne, 
but  that  it  was  not  vital  to  attack  on  this  part  of  the 
front.  (82)  It  may  be  assumed  that  had  Gen.  Fayolle  statement  « 
wished  greater  density  on  the  front  on  which  he  actually  cha' 
attacked,  he  would  have  used  this  division  to  attain  it.  Nov 
The  frontage  strength  per  hundred  yards  of  front  for  the 
1st  Division  in  this  attack  has  been  seen  to  have  been 
465  Infantry  rifles.  The  French  divisions,  weaker  in 
Infantry  rifles,  attacked  on  a  narrower  front.  (83)  The  statement  of 
density  found  for  the  1st  Division  can  therefore  bechambr'un, 

,1,1  •  i.i*  ,       French       Army, 

accepted  as  approximately  the  maximum  desirable  under  NOV.  u,  i9is.  (83) 
the  circumstances  in   the  opinion   of  the  French  high 
command. 

On  August  10,   1918,  the  British  Fourth  Army  was    copy  of  French 

,  .  t  m     i  Official   Order  of 

attacking  on  a  iront  of  about  370  hundred  yards  east  of  Battle  Map,  Aug. 

*  T.     T       T    „    -r,    .    .    T  A  ,.     .    .  10,      1918.      Map 

Amiens.  It  had  9  British  and  1  American  divisions  in  room  files  0-3, 
line.  (84)  The  American  division  can  be  taken  at 
approximately  full  strength,  or  13,500  Infantry  rifles. 
If  the  British  divisions  be  taken  as  approximately  one- 
half  of  this,  on  the  authority  given  above,  the  Army  would 
have  in  line  74,250  Infantry  rifles.  The  frontage  strength 
per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  200  Infantry  rifles. 
The  same  remarks  as  to  the  success  of  the  operation  and 
as  to  density  made  in  the  case  of  the  French  First  Army 


18  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

engaged  in  the  same  attack  apply  here.  However,  the 
frontage  strength  found  for  the  British  Fourth  Army 
approaches  the  figure  of  best  practices  given  in  British 
military  instructions  in  1918.  These  give  a  frontage 
strength  as  varying  from  100  men  per  hundred  yards  of 
front  upward  for  a  division  in  the  attack,  but  state  that 
-?35n  a  smaller  density  than  300  to  500  per  hundred  yards  will 
cS1)  rarely  prove  successful.  (85) 

The  frontage  strengths  so  far  developed  in  the  study 

of  major  operations  during  the  war  with  Germany  are 

considerably  less  than  those  given  by  the  best  authorities 

before  the  war  with  Germany  as  desirable  strengths  for 

attack.  (86)     It  is  evident  that  this  was  not  caused  by 

onMeNumberUofthe  shortage  of  men  on  such  a  large  front,  as  there  is  a 

YarSpin  the  Prin- general    agreement    between    American,    British,     and 

S!B(felSeS?ae! French  authorities,  fixing  the  density  desk-able  in  an 

Library?  (°86)ese  attack  as  about  300  to  500  men  per  hundred  yards. 

The  smaller  density  found  desirable  in  this  last  war  is 

probably  the  direct  result  of  the  highly  developed  power 

of  modern  artillery  and  machine  guns. 

12.  French  and  British  Participation  in  Open  Warfare. 

On  September  27,  1914,  the  French  forces  were  de- 
ployed on  a  front  of  about  5,400  hundred  yards.     This 
excludes  a  small  front  held  by  the  British  Expeditionary 
Corps.     The  French  occupation  extended  from  Douai 
Offic?Ji°oS?rnc?fto  about  80  kilometers  north  of  the  Swiss  border,   and 
seapt!e  2^191°!  incul(1ed   about  43   divisions  in  line.  (87)     The  average 
Map  Ar<g™,  fii|s  strength  in  Infantry  rifles  was  not  at  this  time  above 
Lielt^cS?    defl2>000  Per  division.     It  may  have  been  less.  (88)     At 
Frenei?1  b  Army'  ^ne  maximum  there  is  obtained  the  frontage  strength  per 
NOV.  i4,  wig.  (8sJ  hundred  yards  of  95  Infantry  rifles.     Not  only  is  this 
figure   obtained   from   very  incomplete  data,   it  mani- 
festly does  not  even  represent  the  strength  in  which  the 
portions   of   the   front   actually   were   held.     The   map 
shows  frequent  large  gaps   between  units.     The  figure 
is,   however,    of  value   as   confirming   the   inevitability 
shown  in  American  instances  of  employing  in  open  war- 
fare a  less  density  per  unit  of  front  along  the  whole  front 
of  operations  than  in  major  operations  on  the  stabilized 
line. 

A  study  of  modern  warfare  previous  to  the  war  with 
t6- Germany,  with  the  fighting  on  a  stabilized  line  that  it 
eveloped,  shows  frontage  strengths  very  much  larger 
0 ege  than  those  found  for  American  and  French  units.     The 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  19 

strengths  in  previous  wars  are,  however,  figured  merely 
from  the  front  on  which  battle  was  actually  engaged, 
without  considering  at  all  the  rest  of  the  field  of  operations. 
(89)  In  spite,  therefore,  of  the  apparent  density  of 
troops  in  previous  modern  wars,  it  appears  that  a  maxi- 
mum density  on  large  fronts  was  developed  in  the  great 
attacks  of  the  war  with  Germany. 

The  experience  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Corps  in 
1914  was  too  chaotic  and  changing  even  to  attempt  to 
draw  therefrom  any  British  frontage  strength  in  open 
warfare.  The  British  forces  naturally  had  the  same  ex- 
perience in  semi-open  warfare  in  the  days  preceding  the 
armistice  as  did  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces. 
On  November  10, 1918,  the  British  First  and  Third  Armies, 
with  14  divisions  in  line,  were  advancing  on  a  front  of 
about  715  hundred  yards  in  the  region  of  Mons.  (90)  At 
a  divisional  rifle  strength  of  about  6,000,  the  frontage  g 
strength  per  hundred  yards  would  be  about  120  Infantry  Q-a, A.E.F.  (90) 
rifles. 

13.  Conclusions. 

Conclusions  drawn  from  this  study  are  summarized  in 
a  table  which  follows.  It  must  be  consulted,  however, 
with  these  facts  in  mind:  In  an  effort  to  give  a  simple 
tabulation  round  numbers  only  have  been  employed.  In 
cases  where  a  statement  of  best  practices  has  been  found, 
that  statement  has  been  adopted  rather  than  figures 
drawn  from  isolated  instances.  The  frontage  strengths 
in  open  warfare  are  figured  on  the  entire  front  of  the 
operation.  The  very  name  "open  warfare"  indicates  the 
condition  that  exists.  Troops  operate  as  units,  with  open 
spaces  between  them.  The  frontage  strength  of  a  divi- 
sion or  smaller  unit  would  therefore  be  much  denser  if 
figured  on  the  front  physically  occupied  by  that  unit. 
So  figured,  it  would  depend  on  the  formation  adopted. 
This  formation  might  very  well  approximate  and  give  the 
same  frontage  strength  as  the  formation  of  a  division  or 
smaller  unit  in  a  major  operation  on  a  stabilized  front. 
The  considerations  which  dictate  both  formations  are  the 
same — the  necessity  for  obtaining  maximum  power  and 
the  desirability  of  minimizing  losses. 


20 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 


Best  practices  in  the  number  of  Infantry  rifles  employed  per  hundred 
yards  of  front. 

[In  round  numbers.] 


American. 

French. 

British. 

Quiet  front 

60 

50 

160 

Active  front  

170 

150 

210 

Major  operation 

400 

310 

400 

Open  warfare 

90 

90 

r^o 

from6  tiSj6  World 


14.  Proportion  of  Divisional,  Corps,   and  Army  Troops  to  Infantry 
Rifles. 

For  the  purposes  of  this  study  the  unit  of  strength  has 
been  taken  as  the  number  of  Infantry  rifles  in  front  line 
divisions.  The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  for  a  unit  of 
front  under  varying  conditions  has  been  determined. 
Consideration  of  other  divisional  troops  and  corps  and 
army  troops  has  been  omitted  in  order  to  clarify  this  dis- 
cussion. With  the  basic  figures  established,  however,  a 
consideration  of  the  proper  proportion  of  other  divisional 
troops  and  of  corps  and  army  troops  is  interesting. 

°  organization  can  cover  all  the  possible  c'ontin- 
Wg-Loringhoven,"  gencies  of  modern  war.  (91)  The  great  war  abundantly 
proved  this.  To  attempt  to  deduce  proper  proportions 
from  prewar  European  organization  and  the  changes 
made  would  be  bewildering.  Fortunately  there  exists 
a  statement  of  best  practices  in  the  organization  of  a  field 
army  with  Service  of  Supply  troops  in  the  Priority 
Schedule  prepared  at  General  Headquarters,  A.  E.  F. 
This  is  supplemented  by  Tables  of  Organization,  1918, 
sufficiently  to  determine*  proportions  without  reference 
to  the  million  and  one  varying  instances  which  might  be 
selected  from  the  war  experience  of  American,  French, 
and  British  troops. 

Report  of  c.  in     The  two  documents  cited  above  were  prepared  after 

bied  '  NOV.  *'  20,  a  thorough  consideration  of  allied  organization  and  ex- 

perience after  years  cf  war.  (92)     They  may  therefore 

confidential  ca  fiw^fy.^6  assumed  to  represent  a  composition  of  the  best 

AleE  F°'A8r7  9'  practices  of  allied  armies.     The  Priority  Schedule  was 

1918.  (93)'         '  not  completely  followed  as  drawn  up,  owing  principally 

Report  of  com-  to  the  urgent  necessity  for  shipment  of  Infantry  and 

^i?^rgAernmy;rnachine-gun  units  to  meet  the  emergencies  of  the  spring 

128-129,  Fifc-S;  of   1918.  (93)     The  essential  soundness  of  division  and 

corps  organization  was  proved  in  the  experience  of  the  First 

American  Army.  (94) 


A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE.  21 

It    should    be   noted    that    aviation   units   were   not 
figured  in  the  Priority  Schedule.     Aviation  was  given 
a  separate  schedule  without  regard  for  maintaining  a    Letter  from  c 
properly  balanced  army  in  an  effort  to  lend  most  rapid  g^  ^17EH^' 
assistance  to  the  allied  cause. (95)     As  it  was  omitted  45~7-^5) 
from  the  proportions  arrived  at  by  Gen.  Pershing,  it  may 
be  omitted  in  arriving  at  the  proper  proportions  desired 
for  this  study,  merely  bearing  in  mind  that  an  inclusion 
of  aviation  would  increase  the  proportion  of  corps,  army, 
and  S.  O.  S.  troops. 

Another  point  which  must  be  considered  is  the  inclu-  B?T&ieibi,iSS. 
sion  of  replacement  divisions  in  S.  O.  S.  troops.     While (9( 
originally   included   in    the   organization   of   corps,  (96)    Report  of  c.  in 
replacement  divisions  actually  seldom  functioned  as  such  tied  '  NOV.*'  20, 

.   ,  .       ,,  j.  ,,      1918,  pp.  17 and 23. 

within  the  corps,  and  replacements  were  drawn  from  the  (97) 
general  reservoir  of  newly  arrived  divisions.  (9 7)  Best  Report  of  c.  in 
authorities  give  the  proper  basis  for  number  of  divisions  biedA*  NOV!"*'  20" 
actually  functioning  within  a  corps  as  four,  two  in  lineMBe^rt'ofC.G., 
and  two  in  reserve.  (98)  Eeplacement  divisions  are  con-  fsl-iss^^s)'  pp* 
sequently  figured  in  S.  O.  S.  totals. 

A  third  question  to  be  decided  is  the  number  of  corps    Report  of  c.  G.. 
in  an  army  which  would  normally  be  in  line.     The  First io2et seqnf99)pp' 
Army  generally  employed  four  corps  in  the  attack  in  the 
Meuse-Argonne  battle,  three  west  of  the  river,  one  east. 
(99)     While  other  corps  in  the  First  Army  were  under 
the  circumstances  actually  employed  in  line,  the  Army 
commander  in  his  report  insists  on  the  necessity  of  a  corps 
in  reserve.  (100)     While  the  ideal  corps  in  this  report  is 
described    as    without    permanently    assigned    divisions    id.,  pp.  132-133. 
(101),  there  were  always  divisions  in  Army  reserve  which 
could  have  been  administered  by  such  a  corps.     The 
fifth  corps  included  in  the  Priority  Schedule  is  therefore 
considered  as  being,  with  its  combat  divisions,  in  Army 
reserve. 

The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  in  a  division  is  13,568;    T.  of  o.,  series 
the  total  number  of  officers  and  men  is  28,172.  (102)     For  and  3.  ('102) 
the  purposes  of  the  Priority  Schedule,  however,  the  divi-    pri0rity  sched- 
sion  was  taken  at  27,063. (103)     In  order  to  tie  the  num-^E  Gf.,  pfilef: 
ber  of  rifles  into  the  Priority  Schedule,  the  latter  figure  is (103) 
used  in  obtaining  proportions.     The  number  of  Infantry 
rifles  is  50  per  cent  of  the  strength  of  the  division. 

The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  on  the  front  of.  a  typical 
corps  with  two  divisions  in  line  is  27,136.     The  total 


22  A  STUDY  IN  TROOP  FRONTAGE. 

number  of  officers  and  men  in  the  typical  corps  is  177,070 ; 
less  2  replacement  divisions,  it  is  122,944.  (104)  The 
number  of  Infantry  rifles  on  the  corps  front  is  therefore 
22  per  cent  of  the  corps  strength  in  the  corps  sector. 

The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  on  the  front  of  a  typical 
army  with  four  corps  in  line,  each  with  2  divisions  in 
line,  is  108,544.  The  total  number  of  officers  and  men 
in  the  typical  army  of  five  typical  corps,  plus  army  troops, 
is  685,214.  The  number  of  Infantry  rifles  on  the  army 
front  is  therefore  16  per  cent  of  the  army  strength.  It 
is  9  per  cent  of  the  strength  of  the  army  and  the  necessary 
id.,  summary.  S.  O.  S.  troops  for  its  supply,  including  replacement 
divisions.  (105) 


STATEMENT  OF  WORKS,  DOCUMENTS,  AND  PERSONS  CON- 
SULTED (IN  ORDER  OF  CITATION). 

Features  of  the  War.     Haig.     W.  D.  D.  952 ,1919. 

Deductions  from  the  World  War.    Von  Freytag-Loringhoven. 

The  War  of  Positions.    Azan. 

Memorandum  on  Number  of  Troops  to  the  Yard  in  the  Principal  Battles  since  1850. 

U  167-G  74.    General  Staff  College  Library. 

Strength  and  Organization  of  the  Armies  of  France,  etc.    W.  D.  D.  22,  1916. 
Changes  in  Organization  Found  Necessary  during  the  Progress  of  the  European  War. 

W.C.D.  4886-23, 1915. 
Confidential  Cablegrams,  A.  E.  F. ,  1917-18. 
Brig.  Gen.  George  Simonds,  Chief  of  Staff,  2d  Corps. 
British  Situation  Maps,  map  room  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Report  of  C.  in  C.,  A.  E.  F.,  cabled  Nov.  20,  1918. 
The  War  with  Germany.    Ayers. 
Instructions  on  the  Offensive  Action  of  Large  Units  in  Battle.     No.  767,  Headquarters, 

A.  E.  F.,  1918.     (Translation  from  French  document.) 
Instructions  on  the  Defensive  Action  of  Large  Units  in  Battle.     W.  D.  D.  794,  1918. 

(Translation  from  French  document.) 
Tables  of  Organization,  Series  A  and  B,  1918. 
Field  Orders,  1st  Division,  Historical  Branch,,  file  201. 

Tableaux  d'Effectifs.    U.  A.  702-A  39  (1913-18).     General  Staff  College  Library. 
London  Times  History  of  the  War. 

Lieut.  Col.  de  Chambrun,  French  Army,  attached  to  Gen.  Pershing's  Staff. 
History  of  the  World  War.     Simonds. 
Field  Orders,  2d  Division,  Historical  Branch,  file  202. 
Divisional  Maps,  map  room  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Divisional  Returns,  files  A.  G.  O. 
Maps  of  American  Fronts,  map  room  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Field  Orders,  3d  Army  Corps,  Historical  Branch,  file  183-2. 
The  Tactical  Operations  of  the  78th  Division,  Historical  Branch,  file  278. 
Weekly  Graphics  of  Personnel,  files  G-l,  A.  E.  F. 
Field  Orders,  5th  Division,  Historical  Branch,  file  205. 
Skeleton  5th  Division  History,  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Report  of  Commanding  General,  First  Army,  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Second  Army  Corps  Instructions,  Historical  Branch,  files  182. 
The  Division  in  Attack,  SS-135,  Nov.,  1918.    General  Staff  College  Library. 
Copies  of  French  Official  Order  of  Battle  Maps,  map  room  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Combined  Order  of  Battle  Maps,  map  room  files,  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 
Letter  from  C.  in  C.,  A.  E.  F.,  Oct.  7,  1917.    Historical  Branch,  file  45-7. 
Priority  Schedule,  files  G-3,  A.  E.  F. 

23 

O 


Gay  lord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  V. 
'    PAL  JAN.  21 ,1908 


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